Brokerage Book Valuer

This isn't one clean company. It's a JV wrapped in trusts, and the money moves through two entities before it becomes profit:

• Oshawa Pty Ltd (atf RW Luke Family Trust) — holds the ACL (credit licence). Connective pays all commission into Oshawa. This is the vendor, Luke.
• Finsurance — the credit rep / operating entity. Oshawa passes commission "down" to Finsurance, and also invoices it $13,750/mo (~$165k/yr). That $165k is effectively Luke's owner package (wage, super, cars, fuel) dressed as a licensee fee.
• The JV partner is a financial planner — Johlinda Trust holds 25%, Luke (via Olympia Trust) 75%. Finsurance's ~$100k net profit splits 25/75. The planner's 25% is bought out as part of the sale, so a buyer gets 100% of that ~$100k.

How the money & ownership flows

Two different planners, don't conflate them: Johlinda Trust is a 25% owner (bought out at sale). Luke Patricks is an external referrer (stays, part of the upfront engine). They are not the same person.

The trail files are the raw active-loan list behind the RCTIs. May-26 trail ($22,583.53) and Jun-26 trail ($21,881.51) match the RCTI statements to the cent — so we can trust the data.

FY2026 P&L (Oshawa): Trail $254k · Upfront $255k · Other $11k · Licensee income $150k (internal — washes out). Real aggregator commission revenue ≈ $521k.

Like-for-like May month across three years shows a business that's growing, not winding down:

Trail rising steadily; upfront rising fast; the book grew +12% YoY ($144M → $161M). The vendor also says FY26 was held back by time spent mentoring staff — i.e. there may be upside if that capacity goes back into writing.

Everything points at one question: how much survives the vendor leaving?

• Upfront income ($255k/yr) is relationship-driven. It leans on Luke's referrers — especially Luke Patricks (financial planner, Salt, Grafton) and his doctor brother (several $M of lending). Those relationships may walk. The trail is sticky; the new-business engine is the fragile part. → This is exactly what the "upfront survival" slider is for.
• "$100k profit" understates and misleads. It's struck after paying Luke $165k. Real maintainable earnings depends entirely on whether you cover his capacity with the existing parabroker + admin (both "expected" to stay — get it in writing) or your own people.
• Retiring vendor, over-55 tax strategy. Can't sign until end-Sept, wants fast settlement after. Handover quality is everything — tie a chunk of price to a retention holdback / earn-out.
• Legacy referrers Shane Arnold & Des Sykes sit on the system at $0 — cosmetic, ignore.

• On trail alone ($263k/yr): $1.13M ≈ 4.3× annual trail. Pure trail books trade ~2.0–2.5×. So you're not paying trail-book multiples — you're paying for the operating business + upfront engine on top.
• On total commission ($521k): ~2.2× revenue.
• On "profit": depends entirely on normalised earnings, which the vendor's $100k badly understates.

First-cut fair range: ~$850k–1.1M. So $1.13M is top-of-range / slightly full — justifiable only if the parabroker stays, the referral relationships transfer, and you hold back part of the price against retention. The whole deal hinges on maintainable earnings after Luke — the number the current financials obscure. Use the calculator above to pressure-test it.

• Full FY25 & FY26 financials for both Oshawa and Finsurance (the vendor's "$100k" is only half the picture).
• Written intent from the parabroker and offshore admin to stay, and on what terms.
• Introductions to the key referrers — Luke Patricks and the professional relationships — before signing, not after.
• Clawback / run-off history by month (vendor claims 6 clawbacks, 4 self-inflicted refis) — verify against the RCTI deductions.
• Confirm asset vs share sale, and how the Connective book novates to your aggregator.
• Client concentration: how much trail sits in the top 10–20 HNW Brisbane clients (upside and concentration risk).
• Structure the price: base + retention holdback tied to book value at 12–24 months.